In Sartre's tater philosophy, he substitutes need for desire as a description of the basic relationship between hUDWl beings and the world. Some have laken this substitution, along with Sartre's description ofhuman reality as praxis rather than as consciousness or Being-Jor-itself, to be an abandonment of his earlier ontology. While it is certainly true that the new terminology indicates a new emphasis on social awareness and action in the socio-material world, the idea that Sartre the Marxist has abandoned his earlier philosophy of freedom proves not to be tbe case. Sartre himself says in an interview that his philosophy "underwent a continuous evolution beginning with La Nausee all the way up to the Cr;tique de La Raison DiaLeet; que... 1 In any case, although there is no abandonment of the earlier ontology, there is certainly a shift in emphasis and the introduction of new ideas in the laler philosophy-new ideas which will have consequences for Sartre's conceptualization of social science theory in general and for existential psychoanalysis in particular. Here I would Iike to investigate the significance of Sartre's usage ofthe terms need andpraxis (and its contrary, hais) as these might relate to a Sartrean view of human development and to existentially oriented psychotherapy. In doing so, I will make use both of ideas tThis quote is from an interview wilb Michel Rybalka and olbers in 1he Philosophy 0/Jean-Paul Sartre, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (La SaUe, Illinoi.: Open Court Publilhing Co., 1981), p. 17. from the Crilique and of ideas set fortb in an unpublished manuscript from the mid-nineteen sixties 2 wbich suggest a link: between Sartre's earlier discussion of desire and bis later discussion of need to argue that desire is socially shaped need. I believe that the usefulness of this conceptualization can be demonstrated in Sartre's own description of Flaubert's early cbildhood development as weil as in the case histories of existentially-oriented psychotherapists like myself.
Let us begin with praxis. Praxis, in Search for a Melhod and the Crilique 0/ Dialeetical Reason, is human goal-directed activity. More precisely, Sartre defines praxis as "an organizing project which transcends material conditions lowards an end and inscribes itself, through labour, in inorganic matter as a rearrangement of the practical field and a reunification of means in the light of the end. ,,3 ActuallY, despitelhis new socio-material orientation, praxis has much in common with nihilating consciousness as described in Being and NOlhingness. Praxis, like the nihilating movement of Being-for-itself, is predicated 00 a relationship with the world as a perceived lack of future fullness. Like the for-itself, praxis is self-explanatory and transparent to itself, though Sartre adds that tbis intelligibility is "not necessarily expressible in words. The difference is that in Sartre's later formulation the "situation" inevitably involves work on the socio-material world which is designed, at the most basic level, to produce organismic survival; at the same time, praxis is inextricably interlinked with its socio-material milieu. Sartre therefore insists that "in an individual Iife, each praxis uses Ihe whole of culture and becomes both synchronie (in the ensemble of the present) and diachronie (in its human depth). "6 The later Sartre is concemed to dissociate himself from some of bis more radical earlier statements about the fact that one is free in any situation whatever. Although this is ontologically true, one must distinguish between an ontological freedom which allows one to freely live out the sentence which a society has passed on one and the kind of real freedom whieh more genuinely human society might provide for everyone. Nonetheless, Sartre still insists in the Crilique that dialectical reason, in attempting to elucidate human praxis, must not reduce change to identity; because praxis is not reducible to the material objects and social relations which it intemalizes, it is capable of producing novelty. As Sartre notes, ifwe do not "distinguish the project, as transcendence, from circumstances, as conditions, we are left with nothing but inert objects, and History vanishes. ,,7
Transcendence remains the key to Sartre's later philosophy as weil as to his ethico-political position. In the Crilique, however, Sartre wishes to locate transcending praxis at a much more basic level thanthat allocated to consciousness in Being antI NOlhingness. He therefore no longer terms the fundamental relationship between consciousness and its objects desire; instead he designates this relationship as one of need. Lest the readerthink that the later Sartre has embraced some kind of instinctualism, however, we must hasten to add that need according to Sartre's conception is a human future-directed relationship with the world rather than an instinctual force. Far from a "vis a lergo pushing the human labourer," need is "the Iived perception of a goal aimed at, and this goal is, in the first instance, simply restoration of the organism. Actually, as Sartre bimself admits in tbe unpublisbed manuscript referred to above, need never appears in the already socialized buman world in its pure fonn-except perhaps at birth. Olberwise, need is already socialized. And socialized need, as Sartre points out, is desire. It does not involve mere reproduetion o/Ihe organism but produet;on 0/a self at a more advanced level of tbe dialectic. It is tbe self as value wbich is the object of desire ralber tban tbe simple continued existence of the organism. And Sartre maintains that while pure need is praetical in the sense of heing survival-oriented, desire is elhical in the sense of heing value-making. But just as the organie individual founds and limits the socialization of the serial individual and the common individual of groups, while never appearing in a pure unsocialized state, so need, tbough nowhere to be found in its pure form, founds desire. Even in the Crilique, Sartre had been careful to point out that need is always socialized. Por example, be notes tbat "tbe labourer's work, bis manner of producing himselj, conditions not only the satisfaction of his need, but also the need itself.· 9 As Rohert Stone and Elizabeth Bowman point out in an article, however, this founding of the Sartrean dialectic on organismic need as tbe bedrock of desire is important because it "makes complete interiorization of impotence impossible. ,,10 There is a point in oppression at which tbe slave must revolt.
ODe can, however, go a long way toward distorting and denying needs before tbis revolt will occur. Throughout the Crilique Sartre points out that it is possible to turn praxis ioto hexis,11 changing transcendence ioto mere reproduclion of the past/support of the status quo. In asense, this recreation of the past is an activity of free praxis, but it is an activity whicb undermines that freedom in that people find tbemselves caught in the ·passive activity· of 9Criliql4e, p. 95. obeying the exigenc.ies inscribed in matter and the socio-material order. And while tbis tuming of praxis into hexis is an inescapable aspect of being human, since it arises with the creation of the practico-inert which is an inescapable outcome of the objectification process itself, Sartre objects to its overabundance in a world dominated by scarcity. In such a world, needs are often denied or distorted through tbis transformation, despite the fact 'that the creation of the practico-inert is in the first instance intended to be need-satisfying. Sartre cites the example of certain semi-employed day laborers in the south of ltaly who, constantly malnourished, live their hunger as hexis. They only expect one meal a day or every other day and degrade their vitality accordingly to live in astate of semi-starvation. 12 Only the denial of that one meal, we might surmise, would be likely to arouse revolt against a situation which is othelWise deemed normal. Similarly, Sartre notes in the unpublished manuscrlpt and in his biography of Flaubert, ordinary children from middle class households may leam to deny or distort their needs-turning praxis into hexis.
Before we can fully appreciate this insight, however, we must first understand further how need, through relations with others in the socio-material world, is transformed into desire. This idea is especially significant for existential psychoanalysis, as it will allow us to begin to conceptualize a kind of Sartrean developmental theory. In the unpublished manuscript mentioned above, Sartre discusses how organismic disturbances which in their pure form are referred to as needs get transfonned through interpersonal encounters into desires. From the beginning of life , the responses of others to an infant's organismic needs unveil that infant's being to him or her. To the infant's appeal, the adult caretaker responds by giving or withholding satisfaction. Gradually, through this interaction, appeal to the Other is transformed into demand or right over the other. The infant comes to expect its crles to bring satisfaction in the form of mother's ministrations.
Sartre also explains that needs become intermixed-and symbolic of each other-in t~e context of the family. Alimentation, for instance, becomes sexual and sexual need becomes a way of eating. Artificial desires abstract themselves from cultivated needs. For instance, smoking may refer to eating, nursing, sexuality. By the time a person reaches adulthood, no need appears in its pure form. Allhave been transfonned into desires. Take, for instance, eating. Neither 12Crilique, p. 95. the gourmet nor the ascetic experieoces hunger as simple need. The gourmet subsumes simple hunger in an elaborate social ritual witb an end wbich is not mere organismic survival, but a particular kind of satisfaction wbich has aesthetic as weil as nutritional goals; nor can tbe ascetic witb simple bread and bowl escape living hunger as desire, since the ascetic's choice is etbical (value-making) rather than merely nutritional. As for sexuality, it is always much more complex tban simple satisfaction of an organismic urge. Sexual desire involves a transformation of such organismic disturbances through language and fantasy into a demand to be (tbis or that kind of person) through (this or that kind ot) sexual possession of (this or tbat) object.
The responses of tbe first care-givers are extremely important to tbe way in which an individual comes to live his or her needs/desires in the world. If the mother or primary care-giver responds withjoy, acceptance, and understanding, then need, as Sartre contends in tbe Flaubert biography, will be transformed into adesire which is feit as tbe perpetual possibility for action validating-or ·valorizing,· to use Sartre's own term-oneself and one's needs/desires in the socio-material world. 13 But if, Sartre points out in the unpublisbed manuscript, the primary care-giver responds with irritation, disdain, or hostility, then need will tend to posit itself as illegitimate or culpable need. The infant's need will have been socialized as a kind of prima) being guilty-and tbis heing guilty will come to be feit as an essential aspect of my heing since each time organismic need is rebom (as it is perpetually rebom) my heing guilty will be rebom. Not only my present, but my future (as need wbich has to he fulfilled) is implicated in the reproduction of guilt. For example, I am guilty for heing hungry, siek, ·needy· in general-and I am ashamed of my needs/desires. Such guilt is a response to my being there, my very existence as a needing organism, which is reflected back to me as undesirable in tbis way or that by the original otbers. In psychotherapy, we constantly encounter such ontological guilt.
Sartre's example in 'lhe manuscript we are citing is anorexia. Tbe anorexic, Sartre hypothesizes, displays the desire for a guilt-free need which most be relieved of culpability by the Other's demand and supplication to eat. What the anorexic wants, Sartre teils us, is to experience a need which is wanted by tbe 13Jean-Paul Sartre, 7Jae Family Idiot, vol. one (1971), traOl. Carol Cosman (Cbicago Ind London: The University ofChicago Prel., 1981), pp. 133-34. This will bereafter be referred to in these notes I . Family ldiol, vol. 1.
Other-as the anorexic's original need was apparently unwanted by the original others. The problem is that only a universal supplication could erase the original guilt-and tbis is impossible. The meaning of anorexia thus lies in the movement of desire as a rejeetion 01 need in order 10 be supplicaled. Similarly, forbidden desire may look for a satisfaction whicb simultaneously punishes it and thereby purifies it-as happens in masochism and various other forms of self-destruction. Failure also is an example of need transformed into desire, in this case the desire to prove, by the impossibility of living, that there is an inverse to this impossibility-fulfillment in a more human world.
Obviously, though Sartre's examples are mostly negative, the transformation of need into desire can involve positive as weil as negative development. On the other hand, therapists mostly encounter situations in which development has been painful and Sartre's descriptions are extremely helpful here. Nor is Sartre, in the manuscript cited above, onaware of 'the difficulties involved in a person's attempting to change the fundamental attitude formed in earliest infancy. This is so partially because the very eyes with which one will see new experiences have been clouded by this earliest experience, which must he retotalized each time one encounters something new. The past is surpassable, but only as taken into the detotalization and retotalization as a significant aspect of what is now practico-inert. As my original heing there, this first experience of need as shaped by others into desire is very difficult to surpass in the sense of overcoming my guilt.
This is true because in objectifying myself I reproduce myself and tbis reproduction in the first instance means culpability (if I have experienced a negative response from the original others; othelWise, it means myself as gift, as possibility). My culpability gains the intimate force of need itself. The violence of my hunger, for instance, is the violence of my guilt. What I demand of the satisfaction of my desire is therefore areturn to innocence-a restoration of an innocence which in a sense I never had, since in discovering my need I discovered myself guilty before the original others. What I want is recognition of myself as innocent in the world of the Other; but this recognition is impossible, first because even though the Other might change this would be for other reasons than to validate me and secondly because I at present structure reality in such a way that I probably could not see the change. Thus Sartre says that a long work on the part of the Other is required to free me of my guiIt.
Presumably this is apart of the work of psychotherapy. 118 aim is not unsocialized need, but need/desire freed of the original condemnation.
Sartre's own approach to the Flaubert biography includes a description of the transformation of need into desire (or rather i18 failure) along the lines set fortb in the unpublished manuscript. In The Family Idiot, Sartre attemp18 to show how an unvalorized child, Gustave Flaubert, came to live bis need more as hexisthan as praxis and thereby to adopt the mode of "passive action" as an integral part of his fundamental project. According to Sartre, Flaubert, as an "underloved" child, experienced as an infant the dutiful but cold ministrations of bis mother. Madame Flaubert, Sartre hypothesizes, provided only the best physical care for her son, often anticipating in overly protective fashion his needsbefore they even had a chance to manifest themselves. But in doing so she treated her son as an objeCl rather than as a subject, depriving him of the opportunity to develop an active sense of himself as affecting the world. At an "age when hunger cannot be distinguished from sexual desire" and when "feeding and hygiene condition the first aggressive mode of behavior," Sartre believes that Flaubert was deprived of a sense that he could aggressively satisfy his own needs/desires. 14 This early passivity was not remedied by Flaubert's encounter with a father who acted the pater familias and expected obedience. Even that part of Flaubert's interaction with his father which might have been expected to support him as an agent, his father's insistence on an active furtherance of the Flaubert family glory, escaped Gustave. He simply could not imagine what it meant to act in any real sense; instead he play-acted, dutifully producing the gestures wbich were expected of him by others. He also disappointed his father by his failure to leam to read easily Iike his older brother, a failure which Sartre attributes to the fact that reading requires an active participation of wbich the young Flaubert was little capable. As an escape from the adult world where he was other to himself, Gustave sank into passive ecstasies in which a pantheistic union with nature had the real meaning of obliterating self and world together-a state in which, as Sartre says, "the soul wants nothing, feels nothing, desires nothing. "I S Later oß, as. an adult, Flaubert would complain of a "secret wound, " which Sartre identified as the "passive constitution" wbich resulted from bis earliest interpersonal relations, and of an ennui which never left bim. Describing himself as an adolescent, Flaubert wrote that he was a "mushroom swollen with boredom. ,,16 He would envy less talented souls who were able simply to feel and to act, and he would develop a sexuality wbich revolved around a fantasy of passive ravishment and which found its fulfillment in sporadic adventures with prostitutes and a long distance relationsbip with tbe volatile Louise Colet rather than in real mutuality or commitment. AB a mature writer, Flaubert would show a preoccupation with gestures, ceremonies, and objects rather than with reciprocal relations and with actions. 100ugb be transformed bis early project through an (imaginary) relationsbip with art wbich Sartre also deemed inauthentic, Flaubert was never able to overcome the passivity and isolation which derived from bis original relationsbip with others. He was never able to turn hexis into praxis or to leam the lessons of an active desire or positive reciprocity.
Actually, such people as Sartre describes Flaubert as heing are not uncommon in therapy. I think especially of a client with whom I have worked whose life might be described as a kind of epitome of hexis. This client's mother, apparently an extremely self-eentered, narcissistic woman, had consistently responded to him in ways wbich seemed designed to block the development of an active desire. In effect, she never heard anything which he asked ofher. Instead she substituted her own suppositionsabout who he was and what he needed or wanted for any communications he might have given her on the subject. This client describes himself as being a very passive, "good" child as far back as memory goes. A particularly poignant memory involves a Christmas at horne at about age eight. My client had dutifully, but not very hopefully, made out a Christmas list. As custom had it, he and his brother were allowed to select one gift for opening on Christmas Eve. My client selected a small package, which he imagined to be a toy car he had requested. When he opened tbis gift, bis dismay at discovering "com spears" (spears for holding com on the cob) instead of tbe desired vehicle was greeted by the uproarious 16Family Idiot, vol. I, p. 142. Haul E. Damcs, in Sartre and Flaubert (Chicago and London: The Univcrsity of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 33, translatcs Ibis phrase al "a mushroom stuffcd with ennui.-laughter of bis mother. Not only could she not hear, but her not hearing appeared to malicious. "From that time on," he told me sadly, "I decided never to put anything on my list wbich I really wanted-or probably even to want anything. " This man's difficulties were very similar to those wbich Sartre describes for Flaubert. A1though he did not become a writer like Flaubert (he was interested in writing), it was evident that he used reading as an escape from the real world. Asked about the fact that he had bidden bimself away in a world of books from a very young age, he replied, "Oh, yes, 1 read in order not to be. " In bis relationships with women, he was even more avoidant than Flaubert. After ending a marriage wbich was largely sexless according 10 his wife's desire, he attempted to establish relations with other women. Wbat he discovered was an extreme reluctance to even feel sexual desire in a woman's presence. On a rare occasion when he established a short sexual relationship with a woman, he described bimself as lacking any feeling in bis penis after penetration. "I was only aware of her and not of myself at all." His lack of desire showed up in other areas of his life as weil. For example, he reported baving to force bimself to eat regular meals despite the fact that he had no idea whatever of what he might want to eat. Also, even though he was a successful consultant in a technical field, he reported having no earthly notion about what he might want to do with all the money he made.
A seemingly casual remark which this client made one day in therapy provided an opening into his dilemma. He commented that when people telephoned hirn, they frequently waited a moment after he answered "because they think I'm an answering machine. " "Bven you," he went on to say, "mistook me for an answering machine when you called the other day." I realized that what he said was true. And it occurred to me that the quality in his voice wbich caused him to be mistaken for an answering machine was a quality I often experienced there-the quality of not expecling an answer. His childhood had foreclosed the possibility of bis learning to appeal to others for an answer or to expect/demand that bis needs be met. At tbis point, tbis client began to remember rather vividly what a "desert" (his word) his childhood bad been. He bad leamed there so weil how to lransform praxis into hexis that the wbole world now appeared to be a similar desert in which he embraced the anti-value of "never desiring anything." As praxis began to be reawakened, he began to experience the pain, tbe humiliation, and tbe extreme loneliness which he had previously avoided· by deadening himself and curtailing his desires. Unlike Sartre's Flaubert, he was finally no longer bored.
I think we can DOW understand the interconnection between organismic needs and relational "needs" or desires. It is only when organismic needs are met and shaped in a hospitable human environment that desire develops as a viable and real relationship with the world of objects and other people. Of course, as we know from Sartre's earlier philosophy, demand must be relinquished as a right over others if one is to develop relations in good faith.
But unless the infant comes first to experience agency in being able to bring about the fulfillment of needs by the original caregiver, then to the extent that agency is denied that infant will have leamed to live need as hexis rather than as praxis. The young cbild in such a situation willieam to experience bis or her being in the world of desire as a being passive. Such a child will be more object than subject, and what will develop is something akin to the "false selfM described by psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott. The problem, however, is that there is no "troe self" to be uncovered;tbe release of spontaneity will require extensive work to experience in a new way those needs which are perpetually rebom to be perpetually denied. The fact that they are perpetually rebom, however, allows existentialist therapy to claim that a radical reorientation of oneself as a needing/desiring praxis is possible. The client in therapy must find a way within the therapeutic relationship to transform hexis into praxis-thereby discovering a viable real future which that person has never before experienced. In this respect, on the individual if not on the group level, existentialist therapy might be conceived of as revolutionary praxis.
